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Abstract
This paper describes a theory of character modelling in the context of story understanding. The 
theory attempts to model the goals of the characters in a story, and the system’s understanding of the 
evolution of these goals as the story progresses. We address the issues of how these goals are initiated, 
how they interact with other goals, both of the same character and of the other characters in the story, 
and how they can be used to explain the actions of these characters. In particular, we are interested in 
modelling decisions, and how a theory of decisions can facilitate the understanding of the sequence of 
events in a story. Compliance decisions, which form a subset of general decisions, have been studied as a 
prototype, and the resulting theory has been implemented.
1. Introduction To The Problem
Consider the following sequence of events from a story:
John pointed a gun at Mary.
John told Mary to get into his car.
John drove Mary to his hotel.
Reading these three lines enables us to understand the manner in which the events described relate 
to each other. A conventional story understander could easily infer that Mary got into John’s car when 
he asked her to, and that enabled him to drive her to his hotel. However, this does not tell us why Mary 
got into the car. A theory of goals alone would attempt to explain this by giving Mary the goal of getting 
into John’s car, which is established when John points his gun at her and tells her to get into his car. 
Another possible explanation is that Mary got into the car because she wanted to be in the car. In the 
same manner, we can infer that John got into the car, and assume he did so because he too wanted to be 
in the car.
We feel, however, that such an explanation is inadequate, and misses a crucial point which we, as 
people, grasp immediately. In particular, Mary does not really have the goal of getting into John’s car. 
She does not want to go with John; she only does so because she believes that she would otherwise run
This research was supported in part by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under grant F49620-82-K-0000, and in part 
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the risk of some harm. There is clearly a difference between John’s and Mary’s reasons for getting into 
the car. A complete explanation should capture the support for Mary’s conscious decision between the 
alternatives presented to her.
People continually make decisions. Some decisions arise out of conflict between the goals of a single 
person; economic decisions arising out of scarce resources are a well-known example of this. Decisions 
could also arise out of interactions between the goals of two or more people; the above mini-story is an 
example. Our approach to story understanding incorporates a theory of decisions. We attempt to model 
why decisions arise, what the alternatives involved in the decisions are, and why a particular alternative 
eventually gets selected, which, of course, depends on the context, the character making the decisions, and 
his or her relationship with the other characters involved, if any.
A theory of decisions alone does not an understander make; we need also to model character 
interactions, plans and goals, causality, and several other issues. Several researchers have been interested 
in some or all of these aspects of story understanding. Wilensky’s theory of plans and goals [Wilensky78, 
Wilensky83] is suitable for modelling several of the goals and goal interactions we need to deal with. 
There has been some work on character interactions, relationships and affects [Dyer82a, Dyer82b, 
Lehnert81, Lehnert82], and this is important if the story is to be understood satisfactorily. However, we 
found these theories inadequate in modelling episodes like the one above, in that they did not really 
capture the decision-making processes that were central to the explanation. We needed to model this 
aspect of story understanding as well.
There are theories of decisions in psychology [Kahneman82, Slovic82], but these are either tangential 
to the task at hand, or are inadequate in capturing the subtleties that we intend to capture. We need a 
theory to guide the story understanding process. It has to explain where and why decisions arise (and are 
taken) as the story is read by the understander, not really the mental processes of the characters 
themselves in making those decisions. Models of decision-making of the kind presented in [Doyle80] and 
[Pearl79] address better the latter issue, which is important but orthogonal to our task. Also irrelevant 
for our purpose are the decision tables used in expert systems to model expert decisions (for example, see 
[Szolovits78, Trigoboff78, Weiss78j), the decision procedures of theorem proving (see [Cohen82] for some
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references), and decision trees in learning [Hunt66].
In the rest of this paper, we shall present the context in which the problem arose, and, via an 
example, outline the theory which we developed to solve the problem.
2. The Story Processing Domain
The story processing domain is well suited for the investigation of a variety of theories in Artificial 
Intelligence. Many programs have been implemented dealing with some aspect of this domain. 
Researchers have been interested in the parsing of English language input [Marcus74, Marcus80, 
Schank73], modelling of events and states in the real world [Charniak78, Charniak81], generation of 
coherent English language stories [Meehan76], modelling goals and plans to achieve them [Carbonell79, 
Meehan76, Wilensky83], and several other problems [Dyer82a, Granger83, Lehnert81, Lehnert82, 
Norvig83]. As indicated above, we are interested in modelling decision processes, and how a theory of 
decisions can be useful in understanding the sequence of events in a story.
A story is a sequence of descriptions of states and events in the real world, which are causally 
connected together in some coherent way. These descriptions may be in English, or in some convenient 
conceptual representation form. The participants in the story, called characters, are sentient entities with 
goals, beliefs and desires, who take part volitionally in various actions which typically help them satisfy 
some of their goals. The goals of a character interact with other goals, both of the same character and of 
the other characters in the story, giving rise to decisions points where the character must consciously 
consider alternatives and make a decision. These decisions depend upon the context, which includes the 
state of mind of the character involved, as well as his or her relationships with the other characters 
affected by the decision.
To understand such a story, then, is to take the input descriptions and to construct an internal 
model of the events in the story, the goals of the characters, and how these relate to each other. The 
story presented is typically incomplete in several ways. Many of the actual events and interactions are 
left unspecified, and must be inferred from the ones explicitly mentioned. Causal connections are seldom 
made explicit, and reasons for the observed behavior of the characters usually need to be filled in by the 
story understanding process. The creation of a causally complete model of the imperfectly specified story
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requires much background knowledge about the world.
If the story presents an interesting or useful concept as its overall theme, the relevant portions of 
the story should be extracted so that this new concept can, after suitable generalization away from the 
specifics of the story, be added to the system’s repertoire of world knowledge. We are working on a 
system capable of this kind of learning in the natural language story processing domain [DeJong84], which 
incorporates a theory of learning known as Explanatory Schema Acquisition [DeJong83a, DeJong83b|. 
The problem of decision modelling arose during our explorations with this system. Our model of 
compliance decisions has been implemented in our story processor.
3. The Kidnap Story
The story we are currently working on deals with kidnapping. Since we do not wish to address the 
unrestricted English language parsing problem in this project, we transcribe the story into a conceptual 
representation form, being careful not to augment the conceptual structure from a literal English 
interpretation. This mapping is performed automatically by a simple ‘‘literal-minded” parser. The story 
is presented below in an Englishified form. The conceptual representation is shown in Figure 1.
Fred is Mary’s father.
Fred is a millionaire.
John approached Mary.
John pointed a gun at Mary.
John told Mary he wanted her to get into his car.
John drove Mary to his hotel.
John called Fred.
John told Fred that John had Mary.
John told Fred to give John $250,000 at Trenos restaurant.
Fred gave John the money.
Mary arrived home in a taxi.
Much processing is needed to satisfactorily understand this story, and to understand how John’s goal 
of getting money is achieved. The details of the understanding process are not all relevant here (see
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(parent (subject (person (name (fred))))
(object (peraon (name (marj)))))
(possess (subject (person (name (bred))))
(object (money (amount (order-millions)))))
(more (actor (person (name (john))))
(to (location (of (person (name (mary)))))))
(aim (actor (person (name (john))))
(object (pin))
(at (person (name (mary)))))
(mtrans (actor (person (name (john))))
(to (person (name (mary))))
(mobject (goal (subject (person (name (john))))
(object (move (actor (person (name (mary))))
(to (location (of (car (owner (person (name (john)))))))))))))
(drive (actor (person (name (john))))
(passenger (person (name (mary))))
(to (location (of (motel (resident (person (name (john))))))))
(vehicle (car (owner (person (name (john)))))))
(confine (actor (person (name (john))))
(subject (person (name (mary))))
(in (room (resident (person (name (john))))
(location (motel)))))
(dial-telephone (actor (person (name (john))))
(subject (person (name (fred)))))
(mtrans (actor (person (name (john))))
(to (person (name (fred))))
(mobject (possess (subject (person (name (john))))
(object (social-control (subject (person (name (mary)))))))))
(mtrans (actor (person (name (john))))
(to (person (name (fred))))
(mobject (goal (subject (person (name (john))))
(object (give (actor (person (name (fred))))
(object (money (amount ($250,000))))
(to (person (name (john))))
(at (location (of (restaurant (name (trenos)))))))))))
(give (actor (person (name (fred))))
(to (person (name (john))))
(object (money)))
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(more (actor (person (name (marj))))
(to (location (of (hoose (resident (person (name (marj))))))))
(instrument (car (owner (yelloweab)))))
F icon  1: Conceptual Representation of KIDNAP story.
[De Jong84j for a more complete description), but some of them will become apparent when the modelling 
of the characters’ goals, beliefs and decisions is described.
4. Character Models
4.1. Goals
Every character in the story has certain goals and beliefs, which evolve as the stoiy progresses. 
Some of these are explicitly stated in the story. For example, we could be told that John wanted to buy 
a new car. Some goals are known beforehand to be typical of most people. An example of this is the goal 
of getting money. When the system realizes that John is trying to get Fred to give him money, it ties in 
the sequence of events related to this with what it already knows as part of its “generic” knowledge about 
people. Other examples include life-theme goals [Schank77|.
Most goals, however, need to be inferred, and this process may be quite complicated. In the kidnap 
story, when Fred finds out that Mary is in danger, the system infers that he has the goal of saving her, 
since it has been told that he is her father, and it knows that parents care for their children. This is 
crucial in understanding why Fred gave John the money he demanded. Some goals can be inferred 
directly from certain actions. For example, John tells Mary that he wants her to get into his car, which 
tells the system that his goal is to have Mary believe that he wants her in his car. In general, goals may 
occur to satisfy the character’s own desires or needs, or they may occur on behalf of another character, as 
in the example with Fred wanting to save Mary.
Modelling Characters and their Decisions
Page 7
4.2. Character Models
These goals are represented in character models. Every character in the story has a character model 
associated with him or her. When characters are first encountered in the story, they are given default 
character models, consisting of life-theme goals like satisfying hunger. Another universal goal which 
people typically have is acquiring money. The character models evolve as more goals are stated in or 
inferred from the story. These goals provide the explanations for the various actions that the characters 
perform. When goals are satisfied, they are not used to explain further inputs. However, they remain 
part of the character models, serving as a trace of the evolution of the goal structures, and are an 
important constituent of the final model.
Character models also include decisions considered and taken by the characters. These arise, for 
example, due to interactions among the goals of a character, and between characters, and are considered 
next.
4.3. Decisions and Compliances
There are several decisions to be understood in the above story before all the events can be 
connected together coherently. These are not explicit in the story, but instead must be inferred from the 
given inputs and the system’s background knowledge about the world. For example, when John tells 
Mary to get into his car, Mary must decide whether or not to comply with this request. Such a decision is 
called a compliance, in which one character must decide whether or not to (volitionally) perform a certain 
action for another character’s sake. Another compliance in this story involves Fred, who must decide 
whether or not to give $250,000 to John.
As mentioned above, compliances also form a part of character models. A compliance is represented 
as a compliance-box, which is a schema with three main roles: the actor, the benefitter1, and the action. 
In the second compliance above, for example, Fred is the actor, who is considering the action “give 
$250,000 to John”, and John is the benefitter of the action.
‘To avoid the legal connotations of the word beneficiary, we nse benefitter to denote the character who directly benefitt from 
the action. A character benefits from an action which satisfies one or more of his or her goals. Alternatively, an action can benefit 
a character by satisfying enablement preconditions for another action of which the benefitted character is the volitional actor.
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In general, characters get involved in decisions between two or more alternative courses of action. 
Some decisions arise out of conflict between the goals of a single person, often due to scarce resources. 
Decisions could also arise out of interactions between the goals of two or more people. A compliance is 
such a decision.
Decisions tie in with the rest of the story in two main ways. The understander uses them to explain 
actions, so that the action where Fred gives $250,000 to John is explained as being the (positive) outcome 
of the compliance-box already built. To satisfactorily explain the input, the understander must also 
support the decision itself. This involves explaining (a) why the decision arose in the first place for the 
character, and how the understander realized that there was a decision involved, and (b) why it had the 
outcome that it did. In this example, the compliance gets built because John tells Fred that he wants 
Fred to give him $250,000, which causes the system to anticipate a decision on Fred’s part as to whether 
or not to give John the money. Why he chooses to give the money is explained by the fact that he cares 
for Mary (since he is her father), and he believes that Mary will be safely released if he gives John the 
money.
4.4. A Detailed Example
Consider again the following sequence of events from the kidnap story.
John pointed a gun at Mary.
John told Mary to get into his car.
John drove Mary to his hotel.
It is instructive to trace through the understanding process that the system goes through when 
presented with this input. When the characters John and Mary are first encountered, they are provided 
with default initial character models, which consist of life-theme goals like satisfying hunger, and other 
common goals like acquiring money.
Now the input “John pointed a gun at Mary” is encountered (see Figure 2). The understander 
recognizes this as an action, and tries to link it up with what it knows already. First the preconditions of 
the action are reconciled, for example, that John possess the gun he pointed. This involves inferring the 
preconditions (since we do know that the action occured), and trying to link them up with what the
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(Some Representational Details)
system already knows. The preconditions are basically enablement conditions for the action. However, 
these only tell us that the action could have occured, not why it did. We must also account for the action 
in terms of the goal structure in the volitional actor’s character model. For this input, no such accounting 
can be done as yet, since there is no indication thus far as to why John would want to point a gun at 
Mary, even if he could. The gun pointing episode is also used to prime schemas for higher-level actions it 
could be part of, like shoot and threaten. This corresponds to a bottom-up expectation that John may
iactually be about to shoot (or threaten) Mary.
The next input is “John told Mary to get into his car”. The precondition for this is that John have 
previously established a communication path between himself and Mary, which is assumed to be an effect 
of the previously encountered “John approached Mary” . This line of the story also confirms the (already
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primed) threaten schema, since we know now that John is indeed threatening Mary. This schema is 
instantiated and added to the story model being built. The system now believes that John is threatening 
Mary, and can construct causal and temporal dependencies between the sub-actions of this schema, as 
well as between this schema and the rest of the model. Since Mary knows that she is being threatened, 
instantiation of the schema also has the effect of adding some goals to Mary’s character model. In 
particular, she now has the following goals: one, the goal of getting away from John, and two, while she is 
still in John’s control, the goal of doing what John says so as to avoid harm to herself.
Figure 3: Building a Compliance Box
(Mary's decision r egarding whether or not to move into John's car tor John's sake) 
(Representational details omitted; see Figure £)
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This input also invokes another interesting mechanism. Since Mary knows that John wants her to 
get into his car (having just been told that), the understander expects Mary to make a decision as to 
whether or not to comply with this request. To model this, a compliance-box is added to Mary’s 
character model, which represents the decision of whether or not to get into John’s car for John’s beneGt. 
We also know that if she does indeed comply with the request, she will have done so because she is being 
threatened, and so the understander adds the appropriate support links from the compliance-box to the 
threaten schema, and to the goal, recently established, that Mary has of doing what John tells her to. 
Some of the story model structure is shown in Figure 3.
Now the input “ John drove Mary to his hotel” is encountered. One of the preconditions of this is 
that John be in the car. To achieve this, he must have moved into the car. Since John is the volitional 
actor of the drive, and we expect him to enable other actions he might wish to perform, this poses no 
problem. We still do not know why he would want to drive Mary to his hotel, but given that, we can 
explain his subsidiary actions. Another precondition, and one that is more difficult to resolve, is that 
Mary be in John’s car. To achieve that, she must have moved into the car. But we must explain why 
Mary did such a thing, for since she is satisfying a precondition for one of John’s actions, John (and not 
she) is clearly the direct beneGtter of her action. This is the kind of action which is explained by a 
compliance decision. In this example, we already have a compliance set up for Mary getting into John’s 
car. The understander traces back from “John drove Mary to his hotel” to “Mary is in John’s car”, and 
from there to “Mary got into John’s car” . This is explained by the compliance-box, which is now known 
to have a positive outcome. The reason for this, of course, is that Mary is being threatened by John, and 
hence feels she is in danger.
4.5. Compliances Revisited
We have seen how compliances are used to model people’s decisions about actions that beneGt other 
people. The outcome of a compliance decision could be either positive or negative, representing the 
decisions to comply with or not to comply with the other character’s goal, respectively. The outcome of 
the compliance in the above example was explained by the fact that Mary was threatened by John. In 
general, there are several ways in which the outcome of a compliance may be explained. Threat is one of
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them. Another way to have a character comply is through persuasion, or through bargaining. 
Alternatively, a character may do something for another character out of friendship or courtesy. In the 
kidnap story, Fred helps Mary achieve her goal of escaping from John since he cares for her (being her 
father). Fred complies with John’s goal when he gives him the money for another reason; in this case, the 
compliance is due to the bargain which is set up between the two.
As mentioned previously, the understanding system must support the compliance satisfactorily. It 
must explain why the compliance arose for the character, and how it realized that there was a compliance 
involved. It must also explain the outcome of the compliance. This involves understanding the action, 
the characters and their goals, and the relationships between the characters.
5. Conclusion
We have presented a theory of character modelling including decision making in the context of 
natural language story understanding. This is intended to augment the theory of events, actions, goals 
and plans that a story understander would implement, and to provide an insight into situations where a 
theory of goals alone would be inadequate. Such situations arise frequently in real world stories. We 
outlined an example to illustrate the processes involved in an implementation of our ideas. The example 
has actually been implemented as part of the story processor for the Explanatory Schema Acquisition 
system described in (DeJong84|.
We have been working with compliance decisions, but the theory itself is not limited to these alone. 
We plan to extend it to cover general decisions. Further work needs to be done on modelling character 
relationships, interactions and affects [Dyer82a, Dyer82b, Lehnert8lj, and goal interactions [Wilensky83], 
upon which any theory of decisions must depend for providing the explanation structures underlying the
decisions.
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